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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRENT MAUCHLEY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20000682-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of attempted insurance fraud, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-521 and 76-4-102 (1999). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should Utah join the growing number of jurisdictions that have 
adopted the trustworthiness standard for determining whether a 
defendant's out-of-court admissions can be considered as evidence? 
This Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any alternative ground available 
to the trial court, whether expressly relied on or not. See Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, f 5, 
984 P.2d 980. Whether to do so presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("'correctness' means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law."). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521(1) (1999), states: 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent 
to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or 
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains 
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an 
application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, 
certificate, or contract; 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement 
or representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or 
other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, 
or in connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of 
damages for personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing 
that the statement or representation contains false or fraudulent 
information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a 
fraudulent insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or 
artifice to obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, 
or material omissions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant and his wife with insurance fraud and theft by 
deception, both second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-521 and 
76-6-405 (1999). R. 2-3. Following the denial of his motion to dismiss, defendant 
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entered a conditional plea to attempted insurance fraud, reserving the right to appeal the 
denial of his motion. R. 85, 89-96. Defendant timely appealed. R. 101, 117: 5-6. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant committed insurance fraud and theft by deception when he and his wife 
fabricated a story about falling into an uncovered manhole, lied about their injuries, and 
received a $50,000 insurance settlement. R. 37-38. Defendant's conscience then began 
to trouble him. R. 116: 2, 117: 2, 5. He eventually felt bad enough that he voluntarily 
confessed his crimes to the police. Id. After the State decided to hold him responsible for 
his crimes, however, defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the State failed to 
prove the corpus delicti. R. 33-39. 
The parties argued defendant's motion based on the following stipulated facts: 
On the night of January 5, 1995, the Defendant and his wife, 
Kathleen Bolton, checked into the ER at the FHP Hospital in South Salt 
Lake claiming to have fallen into [a] hole caused by an uncovered water 
meter in the street outside FHP. An off duty police officer working security 
for FHP was shown the hole and barricaded it until it could be filled in. It 
was later determined during an independent investigation by the relevant 
insurance company that a construction truck may have run over the meter 
breaking the manhole cover. 
Both Defendant and his wife received medical attention for their 
claimed injuries. The insurance claim was made to Reliance Insurance Co. 
who apparently insures South Salt Lake City. After civil litigation 
regarding the amount of damages and who was at fault for the open 
manhole, the insurance company settled with Defendant and his wife for 
release of all claims in the amount of $50,000 on August 17, 1998. There 
was never any question that Defendant and his wife had fallen in the hole 
during the investigation and litigation in this case. 
On February 9, 1999, the Defendant went to the South Salt Lake 
police department and told Detective Smartt that he and his wife had seen 
the open manhole and had fabricated the story of falling in so they could 
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obtain money for the fabricated accident. Defendant and his wife were then 
charged with Insurance Fraud in this case. 
R. 37-38. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion, R. 98, 116: 9-10, and defendant entered 
a conditional guilty plea. R. 85, 89-96. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 
up to five years in the state prison, but suspended the prison sentence, placed defendant 
on probation for three years, and ordered that he serve sixty days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail or perform 300 hours of community service. R. 117: 5-6. The trial court also ordered 
that defendant pay full restitution, a $500 fine, a surcharge, and a $150 recoupment fee. 
R. 117:6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him 
because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence, independent of his confession, to 
prove the corpus delicti of insurance fraud. This Court, however, should abandon the 
common law corpus delicti rule and adopt the trustworthiness standard for determining 
whether a factfinder may consider a defendant's out-of-court statements. 
The federal courts and a growing number of state courts have abandoned the 
corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. Under this standard the State 
is not required to establish the corpus delicti. Rather, the factfinder may consider a 
defendant's statement if the State produces substantial independent evidence tending to 
establish that the statement is trustworthy. 
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Jurisdictions have abandoned the corpus delicti rule because it is unsound. The 
rule fails to serve its own purposes, its numerous exceptions further undermine its 
rationale, and it obstructs justice by hindering and even preventing discovery of truth. 
Jurisdictions have adopted the trustworthiness standard because it better protects 
defendants and increases the factfinder's ability to ascertain truth. 
In this case the State produced substantial independent evidence establishing the 
trustworthiness of defendant's confession. Therefore, a factfinder could properly 
consider defendant's confession as evidence. This Court should affirm the trial court's 
decision on this alternative ground. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH SHOULD JOIN THE GROWING NUMBER OF 
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE 
TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD. 
Although defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt, he now urges this Court to 
reverse his conviction on the basis of the corpus delicti rule. In Utah, the corpus delicti 
rule requires that before a defendant's inculpatory statements can be introduced against 
him, the State must prove, by evidence independent of the defendant's statements, that a 
crime occurred. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991). The independent 
evidence must clearly and convincingly show: "(i) '[t]hat a wrong, an injury, or a damage 
has been done,' and (ii) 'that such was effected by a criminal agency, i.e., without right or 
by unlawful means.'" Id. at 1162, 1163 (quoting State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 
(Utah 1938) (alteration in original)). 
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In this case the State concedes that the independent evidence did not establish the 
corpus delicti of insurance fraud. Nevertheless, the independent evidence did establish 
the trustworthiness of defendant's confession. Although the trial court did not apply the 
trustworthiness standard in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, this Court may affirm 
the trial court's ruling on any alternative ground available to the trial court, whether 
expressly relied on or not. See Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, f 5, 984 P.2d 980. For the 
reasons explained below, the State urges this Court to abandon the common law corpus 
delicti rule and adopt the trustworthiness standard. 
A. A growing number of jurisdictions have abandoned the corpus 
delicti rule. 
The federal courts and a growing number of state courts have abandoned the 
corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. The United States Supreme 
Court did so in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91-94, 75 S. Ct. 158, 163-65, 99 L. 
Ed. 101 (1954). See also United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999) 
{"Opper rejected a view which had earlier been the rule in many jurisdictions and was 
deeply rooted in the common law that independent evidence was required to corroborate 
the corpus delicti."). The Opper Court discussed the divergence among the circuit courts 
of appeal in applying the traditional corpus delicti rule and then concluded, "we think the 
better rule to be that the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the 
statements, to establish the corpus delicti." 348 U.S. at 93, 75 S. Ct. at 164. The Court 
then announced the trustworthiness standard: "[i]t is necessary, therefore, to require the 
Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish 
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the trustworthiness of the statement." Id. The Court clarified that "[i]t is sufficient if the 
corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference 
of their truth." Id. In the companion case of Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156, 
75 S. Ct 194, 199, 99 L. Ed. 192 (1954), the Court further explained that "[a]ll elements 
of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, 
but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the 
confession itself and thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused." 
Following Opper, the federal courts quickly adopted the trustworthiness standard. 
The Tenth Circuit, for example, rejected the corpus delicti rule in Braswell v. United 
States, 224, F.2d 706, 711 (10th Cir. 1955). The Seventh Circuit has declared that "the 
corpus delicti rule no longer exists in the federal system, where the requirement is instead 
that there must be substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of the statement." United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
A growing number of states have followed suit. By 1978 at least five states had 
discarded the corpus delicti rule in favor of Opper's trustworthiness approach. See Julian 
S. Millstein, Note, Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for the Corpus 
Delicti Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1219 n.83 (1978). By 1993, at least ten states 
embraced the trustworthiness approach. See Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason: 
Requiring Independent Proof of the Corpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an 
Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 385, 413 (1993). 
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Currently, at least twelve states, plus the District of Columbia, have completely 
abandoned the corpus delicti rule in favor of a trustworthiness approach.1 See State v. 
Hafford, 746 A.2d 150, 173-74 (Conn. 2000) (adopting the trustworthiness standard for 
all crimes); Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1986) ("the adequacy of 
corroborating proof is measured not by its tendency to establish the corpus delicti but by 
the extent to which it supports the trustworthiness of the admissions.") (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 589 F.2d 716, 718-19 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Reynolds v. State, 309 S.E.2d 
867, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) ("corroboration in any material particular satisfies the 
requirements of the law."); State v. Yoshida, 354 P.2d 986, 990-91 (Haw. 1960) ("we find 
sound the reasoning of and align with the authorities which support the rule that does not 
require full proof of the corpus delicti to be established independently of the confession 
before it may be resorted to."); People v. Brechon, 390 N.E.2d 626, 629 (111. Ct. App. 
1979) ("Independent evidence does not have to corroborate the proof as to any particular 
element of the crime charged but only establish a tendency to inspire belief in the truth of 
the accused's confession or admission."); In re: Welfare ofM.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 735 
(Minn. 1984) ("not all or any of the elements [of the crime] had to be individually 
corroborated but could be 'sufficiently substantiated by independent evidence of 
attending facts or circumstances from which the jury may infer the trustworthiness of the 
1
 In addition, a California appellate court applied the trustworthiness standard in 
People v. Cuevas, 280 P.2d 831, 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); however, the corpus 
delicti rule remains the law in California. See People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 472 (Cal. 
1998). 
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confession.'") (quoting Smoot v. United States, 312 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); State v. 
Zysk, 465 A.2d 480, 483 (N.H. 1983) ("Proof of the crime by evidence independent of the 
confession is not necessary. There need only be sufficient corroboration to indicate that 
the confession is trustworthy."); State v. Paris, 414 P.2d 512, 515 (N.M. 1966) 
("corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to 
establish the corpus delicti, bu t . . . the Government must introduce substantial 
independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the 
statement."); State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487, 495 (N.C. 1985) (holding that in all but 
capital cases, "it is no longer necessary that there be independent proof tending to 
establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged if the accused's confession is supported 
by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness."); Fontenot 
v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) ("we now reject the corpus delicti 
line of analysis and reaffirm this Court's prior adoption of the standard which requires 
only that a confession be supported by 'substantial independent evidence which would 
tend to establish its trustworthiness.'") (quoting Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 
75 S. Ct. 158, 164, (1954)); State v. Osborne, 516 S.E.2d 201, 204-05 (S.C. 1999) ("the 
corroboration rule is satisfied if the State provides sufficient independent evidence which 
serves to corroborate the defendant's extra-judicial statements and, together with such 
statements, permits a reasonable belief that the crime occurred."); Moore v. State, 999 
S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of 
Criminal Procedure, "oral statements . . . are admissible if at the time they were made 
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they contained assertions unknown by law enforcement but later corroborated."); Holt v. 
State, 117 N.W.2d 626, 632-33 (Wis. 1962) (holding that corroboration of any significant 
fact is sufficient to allow conviction based on confession). 
Four additional states have embraced the trustworthiness standard, but have 
ambiguously applied it by also discussing the traditional corpus delicti standard. See 
Jacinth v. State, 593 P.2d 263, 265-66 (Alaska 1979) (applying both the trustworthiness 
and corpus delicti standards); State v. True, 316 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Neb. 1982) (holding 
that only slightly corroborated confession is sufficient to establish guilt, but also 
discussing traditional corpus delicti requirements); State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 60-61 
(N.J. 1959) (holding that evidence independent of the confession must tend to establish is 
trustworthiness and prove loss or injury); State v. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 1986) (applying both the trustworthiness and corpus delicti standards). 
In at least three states, supreme court justices have written well-reasoned 
dissenting or concurring opinions urging rejection of the corpus delicti rule and adoption 
of the trustworthiness standard. See Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441,445-46 (Fla. 1993) 
(Shaw, J., dissenting) (stating that the corpus delicti rule "is an anachronism," and "a 
technicality that impedes rather than fosters the search for truth."); People v. McMahan, 
548 N.W.2d 199,203-09 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., dissenting) (stating that the corpus 
delicti rule "promises too much, while it delivers too little."); State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 
907-11 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) ("Stare decisis should not stand in the 
way of enhancing the truthfinding purpose of criminal trials."). 
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Even states that retain the corpus delicti rule have recognized the rule's extensive 
criticism. State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d 160, 164 (Me. 1983) ("Commentators have decried 
the confusion [surrounding application of the corpus delicti rule]."); State v. Hansen, 989 
P.2d 338, 346 (Mont. 1999) ("Eventually, the corpus delicti rule outlived its usefulness 
and the rule was thoroughly disparaged by commentators."); Sheriff, Washoe County v. 
Dhadda, 980 P.2d 1062, 1065 n.l (Nev. 1999) ("Commentators have generally agreed 
that the corpus delicti rule is no longer needed . . . ."); State v. Ralston, 425 N.E.2d 916, 
919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) ("Other jurisdictions and text writers assert that the purpose of 
the corpus delicti rule is met if the state produces independent evidence showing the 
trustworthiness of the confession."); State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 222 (Wash. 1996) ("The 
corpus delicti rule has been criticized by courts and legal commentators."). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also acknowledged the questionable policies behind 
the corpus delicti rule. See State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957). In Weldon 
the court noted that "[notwithstanding its universality, eminent authorities have gravely 
doubted its validity." Id. at 355. Although recognizing that "[t]he arguments presented 
by those who criticize the rule are not without some merit," id. at 356, the court 
nevertheless applied the rule "in deference to the time honored and important precept of 
our law that it is better that ten guilty go free, than that one innocent be punished." Id. 
The corpus delicti rule remains the law in Utah. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1162-63 (Utah 1991). Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has included 
language in some opinions acknowledging the trend toward the trustworthiness approach. 
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For example, in State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Utah 1938), overruled in part and 
on other grounds by State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 188 (Utah 1943), the court stated, 
"[confessions are necessarily weak or strong evidence according to the circumstances 
attending the making and proving of them; and we think the only safe general rule is to 
require some other evidence corroborative of their truth." The court continued, "such 
corroborative evidence must consist of facts or circumstances appearing in evidence 
independent of the confession and consistent therewith, tending to confirm and strengthen 
the confession." Id. at 1016. 
In Weldon, the court went so far as to declare that, "the generally accepted view, to 
which we give our approval, is that the evidence independent of the confession need not 
establish the corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof." 314 P.2d at 356 (emphasis 
added). The court further explained that, "the whole evidence, including the confession, 
may be considered together in determining whether the corpus delicti has been 
satisfactorily established." Id. 
Finally, in Johnson, the court acknowledged the opportunity to address the 
trustworthiness standard. See 821 P.2d at 1163 n.9. The court reserved this opportunity 
for a later case, however, finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the traditional 
corpus delicti rule. See Id. The time has come for Utah to adopt the trustworthiness 
approach. 
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B. Stare decisis does not justify retaining the corpus delicti rule. 
This Court "is not inexorably bound by its own precedents." See State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (overruling the automatic reversal rule of Crawford v. 
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975). Rather, this Court "will follow the rule of law 
which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. As will be demonstrated 
below, the corpus delicti rule is no longer sound because: (1) it poorly serves it own 
purposes; (2) its numerous exceptions further undermine its rationale; and (3) it obstructs 
justice by hindering and even preventing discovery of truth. Abandoning the rule in favor 
of the trustworthiness standard will produce more good than harm. The trustworthiness 
approach is superior because it better protects defendants while increasing the factfinder's 
ability to ascertain truth. 
1. The corpus delicti rule is unsound because it poorly serves 
its own purposes. 
The corpus delicti rule developed in England in response to the very specific 
problem of supposed murder victims "reappearing" after their "murderer's" execution. 
See Mullen, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 399-401. Perry's Case, for example, is often cited as a 
"galvanizing force" in the development of the corpus delicti rule. Id. In that case a 
suspect confessed to murder and implicated his mother and brother as well. Id. After all 
three were executed, the supposed victim appeared and recounted a bizarre story about 
being sold into slavery in Turkey. Id. 
13 
Whatever its origins, "[i]t is unclear whether the corpus delicti rule ever became 
part of English common law/' Id. at 400-401. If it did, "it was an ill-defined feature of 
the law related to homicide and was rarely, if ever, extended to other crimes." Id. See 
also, 7 John H. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2072, at 524 (revised by James H. Chadboum 
1978) (English rule limited to homicide). As Wigmore observed, "[t]he policy of any rule 
of the sort is questionable." Wigmore, § 2070, p. 510. 
In America, the rule remains a creature of the common law; "no court has ever 
held that the rule is constitutionally grounded." Mullen, U.S.F. L. REV. at 387; 
McCormick on Evidence, §145 at 521 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). American 
jurisdictions, however, have expanded the rule beyond its narrow English origins and 
applied it to all types of crimes. See State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957) ("In 
this country, the corpus delicti rule is applied to all crimes . . . . " ) . 
Modern courts and commentators generally justify the corpus delicti rule as 
serving three purposes: first, protecting the mentally unstable who falsely confess; 
second, avoiding reliance on repudiated confessions out of concern for voluntariness; and 
third, promoting better law enforcement by reducing reliance on confessions. Mullen, 
U.S.F. L. REV. at 401. "In every case," however, "the rationale proves too much while 
the corpus delicti rule delivers too little." Id. 
First, the rule does little to protect defendants who are mentally unstable and 
falsely confess. Because the rule only applies to out-of-court statements, see Weldon, 314 
P.2d at 354, it offers no protection to the determined lunatic who confesses to an 
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imaginary crime and proceeds to plead guilty. See Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 402-03. 
Nor does the rule protect the person who falsely confesses to an actual crime, because it 
only requires proof that a crime was committed by someone. Id. 
Second, the idea that the corpus delicti rule avoids reliance on involuntary 
confessions is fallacious. Ironically, the corpus delicti rule allows the use of a dubious 
confession if the prosecution can produce independent evidence of a crime, yet 
completely bars the use of a concededly voluntary confession if there is no proof of the 
crime. Id. at 405. 
Furthermore, modern constitutional and statutory protections surpass the rule's 
utility as a means of protecting the mentally unstable, or avoiding reliance on 
involuntarily confessions. See People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Mich. 1996) 
(Boyle, J., dissenting). For example, a confession obtained by exploitation of a 
defendant's insanity violates due process and is inadmissible, even if other evidence 
corroborates the confession or establishes guilt. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 
206-07, 80 S. Ct. 274, 280,4 L. Ed.2d 242 (1960). Likewise, the totality of the 
circumstances, including consideration of a defendant's mental disabilities and 
deficiencies, may render a confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. State v. 
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, fflf 15,45, 984 P.2d 1009. When a defendant challenges the 
voluntariness of a statement, the burden is on the State to demonstrate that the statement 
was voluntary. Id. at f 45 (quoting State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992)). 
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Additionally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 
(1966), assures that all defendants are advised of their right to remain silent and their 
right to the presence of counsel during a custodial interrogation. The United States 
Supreme Court has also established a bright-line rule forbidding the police from initiating 
an interrogation following a defendant's exercise of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. 
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L. Ed.2d 378 
(1981); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 11410, 89 L. Ed.2d 631 
(1986). 
A criminal defendant also has a statutory right to petition for an evaluation of his 
mental competency at any stage of a criminal proceeding. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-
3(1) (1999). A trial court may also raise the issue of a defendant's mental competency at 
any time. Id. at § 77-15-4. As the above precedents and statutes demonstrate, any 
"suggestion that the corpus delicti rule meaningfully buttresses the right against coerced 
self-incrimination is anachronistic at best." Mullen, U.S.F. L. REV. 405. 
Finally, contemporary jurisprudence has also undermined the rationale that the 
corpus delicti rule promotes better law enforcement. "The notion that law enforcement 
can be made better by barring confessions ignores the fact that voluntary confessions are 
sometimes the product of good law enforcement." Id. at 406. When the police skillfully 
obtain a confession from a suspect in full compliance with the constitutional protections 
outlined above, it does not promote good law enforcement to bar admission of the 
confession on the grounds of the corpus delicti rule. Id. 
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Furthermore, the law enforcement improvement rationale fails to explain the limits 
of the rule. Id. If the rule is designed to force the police to solve a crime unassisted by 
the suspect, then the rule should not allow the police to rely on the suspect's confession to 
establish the most important part of their case: "'that the accused was the guilty agent.'" 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 
39, 41 (Utah 1987)). 
The corpus delicti rule, as Judge Posner observed, was "never well adapted to its 
purpose." United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 939-40 (7th Cir 1988). A rule that fails 
to serve its own purposes is unsound and should be abandoned. 
2. The rule's numerous exceptions demonstrate its infirmity. 
States that retain the corpus delicti rule have created numerous exceptions and 
reduced the amount of evidence necessary to satisfy it. Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 407. 
The need to create so many exceptions, however, further demonstrates the rule's 
infirmity. As one commentator observed, "[t]he common need to work around the rule to 
achieve justice suggests that justice would be better served by abandoning the rule." Id. 
at 417. 
For example, in Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d 462, 466-67 (Ind. 1990) the 
Indiana Supreme Court observed that "[s]trict adherence to the corpus delicti rule, in light 
of its declining utility, presents great difficulties in modem criminal law." Thus, the court 
created an exception to the rule allowing into evidence a confession regarding multiple 
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crimes, although independent evidence only established the corpus delicti of the principle 
crime. See id. 
Several states have realized that the rule is poorly suited for application in some 
criminal prosecutions. In Arizona, for example, the legislature has abolished the corpus 
delicti rule in automobile collision cases resulting in injury or death. See State v. 
Daugherty, 845 P.2d 474, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). The Arizona Court of Appeals 
further narrowed the rule when it held the rule inapplicable to crimes in which statements 
themselves are the corpus delicti, such as pandering, solicitation, promotion of gambling, 
or offering to sell narcotics. Id. at 478. Likewise, the Nevada Supreme Court abandoned 
the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard in a prosecution for 
conspiracy to commit murder. See Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 911 (Nev. 1996). These 
states have discovered that the corpus delicti rule has become increasing difficult to apply 
as crimes have become more numerous and complex under modem criminal codes. 
McCormick on Evidence, §147 at 528 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). This is 
especially true for crimes "that may not have a tangible corpus delicti, such as attempt 
offenses, conspiracy, tax evasion and similar offenses." Id. 
Some states have relaxed the rule by not requiring that proof of the corpus delicti 
exclude all inferences of a noncriminal cause of the harm or injury. See Commonwealth 
v. Williams, 417 A.2d 1200,1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("A corpus delicti may exist even 
though the circumstances may also be consistent with innocence."); People v. Ochoa, 966 
P.2d 442,473 (Cal. 1998) (involving a rape charge). 
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Several states, including Utah, have also excluded application of the rule to certain 
categories of statements. See Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 409-10. In Utah, and 
Pennsylvania, for example, the rule only applies to inculpatory statements. See State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991); Commonwealth v. Verticelli, 706 A.2d 820, 
824 (Pa. 1998) ("Only inculpatory statements of an accused are subject to the protection 
of the corpus delicti rule."). Furthermore, Johnson also excludes application of the rule to 
statements made before or during the commission of a crime. Id. at 1162-63. Other states 
have a similar exception. See Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 410-11. 
States have further limited the corpus delicti rule by reducing the amount of 
evidence necessary to satisfy the rule. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held 
that independent evidence of the corpus delicti need not prove commission of the crime 
charged by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Wetter, 644 A.2d 839, 841 (Vt. 
1994) ("Slight corroboration may be sufficient."). Likewise, in Massachusetts, "the 
standard for the corroboration rule . . . is merely that there be some evidence, besides the 
confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that is, that the crime was 
real and not imaginary." Commonwealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 940 (1991) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
These numerous exceptions evidence the infirmity of the corpus delicti rule. As 
one commentator observed, the creation of so many exceptions to the rule has "generally 
distanced the corpus delicti rule even further from its nominal purposes. The exceptions 
consume much of the rule and the relaxed evidentiary standard so dilutes the remainder 
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that any argument for retaining the corpus delicti rule is seriously undercut." Mullen 27 
U.S.F. L. REV. at 407. 
3, The rule is also unsound because it obstructs justice by 
hindering and even preventing discovery of truth. 
"[T]he central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 107 S. Ct. 
515, 521, 93 L. Ed.2d 473 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 
106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L. Ed.2d 674 (1986)). The exclusion of evidence, even to 
protect constitutional guarantees, deflects a criminal trial from its basic purpose. See Id. 
The exclusion of evidence to serve an anachronistic and unsound common law rule, 
however, obstructs justice. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2070 at 510 (Chadbourn rev. 
1978). 
Literal application of the corpus delicti rule evidences its propensity to obstruct 
justice. For example, if a defendant is careless enough to leave behind a body or other 
corroborating evidence, the rule allows the prosecution to confront him with his 
confession. People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., 
dissenting). The rule bars the use of a more cunning defendant's confession, however. 
Id. 
In McMahan, for example, the victim left her apartment with the defendant. Id. at 
200. She was in bare feet, wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts, and did not take her 
purse, her thyroid or epilepsy medication, or any identification with her. Id. at 200, 209. 
She promised to return home by midnight; but was never heard from again. Id. She was 
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not discovered in any hospital or morgue, she had not recently contacted any of the 
governmental agencies she frequented in the past, and her sole means of support, welfare 
and Medicaid checks, went uncollected. Id. at 200, 209. 
McMahan eventually confessed to two other murders and gave three full 
confessions detailing the victim's murder. Id. He stated that he originally buried the 
victim in the basement of his house, then in an alley next to his house, and eventually 
placed her body in trashbags and threw them in a city dumpster Id. A tracking dog 
detected a human scent inside a crawl space and in the alley, and a police officer testified 
about a hole in the basement that had been dug out and filled in. Id. 202, 209. The police 
never recovered the murder weapon, nor did they find any human blood stains in the 
defendant's house. Id. at 202. Although the court acknowledged that the nearly five year 
delay between the alleged murder and defendant's confession hampered the collection of 
evidence, id., it nevertheless upheld the reversal of McMahan's murder conviction on the 
grounds that the evidence did not establish the corpus delicti. Id. at 203. 
Justice Boyle, however, criticized the court's failure to abandon the corpus delicti 
rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. See Id. at 209 (Boyle, J., dissenting). He 
lamented that "the common-law corpus delicti rule operates to shield a recanting 
defendant cunning enough to destroy a body or conceal its identity, despite a voluntary 
and reliable confession to the crime. That price is too high." Id. 
Other examples of the unjust results that the rule often produces are easily 
discoverable, even in Utah. For example, in State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Utah 
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1938), the Utah Supreme Court applied the corpus delicti rule to reverse a mother's 
conviction for murdering her newborn child, finding that the trial court erred in admitting 
her multiple, voluntary confessions. Johnson testified that in sub-zero weather on the 
night of 1 February 1937, she gave birth to a baby boy, unattended, although her mother 
slept in the same room and her brother in an adjoining room. Id. at 1012. She was 
unconscious for an hour or more after giving birth, but when she regained consciousness, 
she discovered the baby in the bed covered in the vernix caseosa, and with part of the 
placenta attached. Id. She discovered that the baby was not breathing, nor was its heart 
beating. Id. She left the baby under the covers until the next evening when she carried it 
to a park and left it in a public toilet. Id. 
She told her doctor and the police a different story. Id. A few days after the baby 
was discovered, Johnson went to her doctor hoping that an examination would prove that 
she had not recently given birth. Id. The examination prove the opposite, and the doctor 
asked Johnson whether the baby found in the toilet was hers. Id. Johnson then told the 
doctor that she already had enough children, couldn't raise another, and demonstrated 
how she had put her hand over the baby's nose and mouth to suffocate it. Id. at 1012-13. 
A few days later she again told the doctor that she had suffocated the baby and when she 
was sure that it was dead, she pushed it down under the bed clothes and covered it up. Id. 
Johnson also confessed to the deputy sheriff that she killed the baby. Id. 
The court upheld the trial court's findings that Johnson's confessions were 
voluntary. Id. at 1013-14. Nevertheless, the court determined that the confessions were 
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erroneously admitted because there was no proof of the corpus delicti. Id. at 1014-18. 
The court cited the absence of marks of violence on the infant or any external signs of 
suffocation, and the doctor's testimony that the infant died of asphyxiation. Id. at 1016. 
In a similar case, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a babysitter's 
manslaughter conviction, finding that there was insufficient independent evidence of the 
corpus delicti. State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 225 (Wash. 1996). An autopsy revealed that 
the infant victim died of either Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) or acute 
respiratory failure. Id. at 214. A pathologist testified that it was possible that manual 
interference or suffocation could begin the process of respiratory failure in an infant but 
that the interference or suffocation was not necessarily detectable in an autopsy. Id. The 
pathologist was unable to determine whether the death might have been caused by manual 
interference or SIDS. Id. 
In the days after the infant's death the babysitter, Aten, put some of her 
possessions in storage, asked people to temporarily keep other possessions and gave some 
of them away. Id. at 214. She told her daughter that she was doing this because "the 
sheriff might lock the whole house up." Id. When the baby's mother told Aten that the 
autopsy showed the baby died of SIDS, Aten told here that was not true. Id. 
Aten later confessed to the baby's mother that she killed the baby by smothering 
her with a pillow because the baby had cried all night. Id. at 215. In a separate statement 
to the police she explained that she put her hand over the baby's mouth and nose until the 
baby calmed down, but that the baby was still fussing when she put the baby back in bed. 
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Id. at 216-17. Although the court found that Aten's waiver of rights and confession were 
voluntary, it nevertheless held that under the corpus delicti rule, the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain her conviction. Id. at 224-25.2 
The corpus delicti rule also hinders prosecutions of child sexual abuse. For 
example, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a conviction for first-degree child 
molestation because facts independent of the defendant's confession did not establish the 
corpus delicti. See State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). In Ray, the defendant 
and his wife were sleeping in their bedroom when their three-year-old daughter came into 
the room asking for a glass of water. Id. at 904. Ray, who normally slept nude, left the 
room with his daughter to get the water. Id. He later returned to the bedroom upset and 
crying, awoke his wife, and had a discussion with her. Id. She immediately became upset 
and ran to check on her daughter, who by this time had fallen asleep. Id. Ray's wife 
returned to the bedroom and after further discussion, Ray placed a call to his sexual 
deviancy therapist. Id. at 904-05. 
Ray confessed to the police that he gave his daughter a glass of water and took her 
back to her bedroom. Id. at 905. When she got into bed he took her hand and placed it on 
his penis. Id. After a few seconds the daughter pulled away and Ray returned to his 
bedroom where he admitted the act to his wife. Id. Ray stipulated to the facts in the 
2
 One commentator has aptly described the hazards of applying the corpus delicti 
rule in cases involving SIDS. See Catherine L. Goldenberg, Comment, Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome as a Mask for Murder: Investigating and Prosecuting Infanticide, 28 
Sw. U. L. REV. 599,612-17 (1999). 
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police report and waived his right to trial. Id. Nevertheless, the court applied the corpus 
delicti rule and reversed his conviction, feeling "bound to follow our previous rulings on 
the issue." Id. 
The court did so over Justice Talmadge's well-reasoned dissent wherein he stated, 
"[t]he rule of corpus delicti has become a serious impediment to the proper handling of 
certain kinds of cases, particularly those involving highly vulnerable or youthful victims 
of crime who cannot give voice to the fact of the crime against them." Id. at 910 
(Talmadge, J., dissenting). Justice Talmadge continued, "In cases such as the one before 
us, infanticide or child abuse by suffocation, where independent evidence of the crime 
may be virtually unattainable, it is contrary to the interests of justice to permit the corpus 
delicti rule to prevent the trier of fact from considering a confession." Id? 
The above cases illustrate the propensity of the corpus delicti rule to "prevent[] 
finding the truth." Id. at 910-11. The corpus delicti rule extracts a high price "in the form 
of reversed convictions of guilty persons, [and] prosecutions abandoned or never begun 
for want of independent evidence of the corpus delicti " Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 
386. As Justice Talmadge reasoned, "[s]tare decisis should not stand in the way of 
enhancing the truthfinding purpose of criminal trials." Ray, 926 P.2d at 911. 
3
 Another case that demonstrates how the corpus delicti rule can frustrate justice in 
child sexual abuse cases is Commonwealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 942 (Mass. 1991) 
(reversing convictions for rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child). 
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4. The trustworthiness approach is superior because it better 
protects defendants while increasing the factfinder's 
ability to ascertain truth. 
As Justice Boyle observed in his dissent, the trustworthiness approach more 
directly protects the confessing defendant than does the corpus delicti rule. See State v. 
McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., dissenting). The corpus delicti 
rule insures only that a crime has been committed by someone. Id. The trustworthiness 
approach, however, insures that a particular statement is sufficiently reliable for the 
factfinder to hear it. Id. Furthermore, the trustworthiness approach applies to any of a 
defendant's out-of-court statements, see Opper, 348 U.S. at 91-92, 75 S. Ct. at 163-64, 
not just inculpatory statements. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162. 
The trustworthiness approach, like the corpus delicti rule, protects a defendant in 
the situation where no crime has been committed. Without the commission of an actual 
crime it would be difficult to discover significant evidence establishing the 
trustworthiness of the defendant's confession to the imaginary crime. The trustworthiness 
approach is superior to the corpus delicti rule, however, because it also protects a 
defendant who falsely confesses to an actual crime that someone else has committed. 
McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 207 (Boyle, J., dissenting). "Where there is an indication of 
unreliability, 'the trial judge . . . should exercise great care in determining whether the 
statements of the accused were corroborated.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Calderon, 
348 U.S. 160,164, 75 S. Ct. 186, 188, 99 L. Ed. 202 (1954). As Justice Boyle observed, 
the trustworthiness approach also protects a defendant from "a dishonest police officer, a 
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self-interested accomplice, or a malicious enemy [who] seeks to frame an innocent 
defendant by fabricating a story that the defendant confessed to committing an actual 
crime." Id. at 207 n. 11. 
The trustworthiness approach is also superior when applied to crimes without a 
tangible injury or loss such as attempt offenses, conspiracy, or tax evasion. Id. at 207; 
See also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154, 75 S. Ct. 194, 198, 99 L. Ed.2d 192. 
In those cases, it cannot be shown that a crime was committed without identifying the 
accused. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 207 (Boyle, J., dissenting). Application of the corpus 
delicti rule to those cases would require evidence of the identity of the offender, thus 
providing more protection to an accused "than the rule affords to a defendant in a 
homicide prosecution . . . . " Id. 
The trustworthiness approach is also easier to apply. As modern statutory criminal 
law has increased the number and complexity of crimes, "[sjimply identifying the 
elements of the corpus delicti... provides fertile ground for dispute." McCormick, § 147 
at 528. Once the elements of the corpus delicti are defined, the court must then examine 
whether the independent evidence satisfies those elements, keeping in mind the numerous 
exceptions to the rule. Id. On the other hand, the trustworthiness approach simply 
examines whether there is substantial independent evidence to corroborate or establish the 
truthfulness of the defendant's statement. See Opper, 348 U.S. at 93, 75 S. Ct. at 164. 
The trustworthiness approach also increases the factfinder's ability to discover the 
truth. In cases without a tangible loss or injury, or where actual loss is shown but 
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evidence of criminal agency is lacking, the trustworthiness approach allows the factfinder 
to hear a validly obtained and voluntary confession, whereas the corpus delicti rule bars 
such evidence. Ray, 926 P.2d at 910-11. As McCormick concluded, if a corroboration 
requirement is to be retained, "[t]he Supreme Court's [trustworthiness] approach," rather 
than the corpus delicti rule, "is best designed to pursue the realistic objectives of a 
corroboration requirement." McCormick, § 145 at 524. 
Just two and a half years after Opper, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the 
corpus delicti rule should not be "applied to create a device for protecting defendants who 
reek with guilt." State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957). "[T]he rule should be 
applied with caution and not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction to the 
administration of justice." Id. at 376. The Court further cautioned, "[l]egal doctrines, 
while appropriate in one setting, may become a deterrent to justice when overxtended 
[sic]." Id. (quoting Note, The Corpus Delicti-confession Problem, 43 Journal of Criminal 
Law 214 (1952)). 
This Court "will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, 
unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound 
because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (overruling the 
automatic reversal rule of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975)). Like the 
rule overturned in Menzies, the corpus delicti rule "does not work very well." Id. at 400. 
While the rule may have had some utility when the Court decided Weldon, the rule was 
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unsound from its inception and the growing complexity of the modern criminal code has 
only reinforced that conclusion.4 Subsequent constitutional and statutory protections have 
surpassed the rule, rendering it an anachronism. As in Menzies, "candor in the law would 
be better served by abandoning [the corpus delicti rule] rather than straining against its 
requirement[s]" by fashioning broad exceptions. Id. Unlike Judge Learned Hand, this 
Court should not feel constrained by stare decisis, to follow the common law corpus 
delicti rule, all the while doubting that the rule "has in fact any substantial necessity in 
justice...." Daeche v. United States, 250 F. 566, 571 (2nd Cir. 1918). The common law 
corpus delicti rule is no longer sound and the trustworthiness approach is superior; this 
Court should therefore adopt the trustworthiness standard. 
II. DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS TRUSTWORTHY. 
As set forth above, the trustworthiness standard allows the factfinder to consider a 
defendant's out-of-court statement if the prosecution "introduce^] substantial 
independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement." 
Opper, 348 U.S. at 93, 75 S. Ct. at 164. This evidence need not be sufficient to establish 
the corpus delicti. Id. Rather, "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential 
facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." Id. Defendant's 
confession was admissible under this standard. 
4
 The modem criminal code abolishing all common law crimes became effective 1 July 
1973. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-102 and 76-1-105 (1999). 
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Defendant confessed that the alleged accident occurred in South Salt Lake; the 
alleged accident involved both him and his wife; they both saw an uncovered manhole; 
they decided to fabricate a story about falling into the hole; they did so in order to obtain 
money; and they in fact obtained money by fraud. R. at 37-38. 
Substantial independent evidence tended to establish the trustworthiness of 
defendant's confession. The evidence established that both defendant and his wife sought 
treatment for injuries allegedly suffered outside the FHP hospital in*South Salt Lake; both 
reported that they were injured when they fell into an uncovered manhole outside the 
hospital; a security officer discovered an uncovered manhole near the hospital; both 
defendant and his wife filed nsurance claim based on the alleged accident; and both 
received a $50,000 insurance settlement. R. at 37-38. The independent evidence also 
established that defendant's confession was voluntary. Id. Therefore, under the 
trustworthiness standard, a factfinder could properly consider the defendant's confession 
as evidence of his guilt. 
Although the trial court did not apply this standard in denying defendant's motion 
to dismiss, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any alternative ground 
available to the trial court, whether expressly relied on or not. See Doe v. Maret, 1999 
UT 74, f 5, 984 P.2d 980. For the reasons set forth above, this Court should abandon the 
common law corpus delicti rule, adopt the trustworthiness standard, and affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the denial of defendant's 
motion to dismiss, and thereby affirm his conviction as well. 
Respectfully submitted this lLt day of March, 2001. 
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